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Organizations can choose how to integrate information security through planning and structuring of the information 
security function. This study aims to examine how the planning and structuring choices of the organization impacts 
the effective utilization of information security strategies. This study examines information security planning 
integration through a stages of growth perspective and finds that more mature information security planning 
integration is positively correlated with more effective utilization of information security deterrence, detection, and 
recovery strategies. This study also finds that a decentralized structure of information security management activities 
has a positive effect on the maturity of information security planning integration. This study suggest the maturity of 
information security planning integration that has a direct effect on the utilization of information security strategies 
and mediates the relationship between structure of information security management activities and utilization of 
information security strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A recent survey found that, as far as management is concerned, information security was not among the top ten 
critical issues in management of information systems [Pimchangthong et al. 2003]. However, there are indications 
that management’s perceptions about information security may be changing. New laws, like the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, are increasing management’s liability with respect to protecting financial information under their control, 
and evidence suggests information security breaches are problematic in many organizations. According to the 2007 
Computer Security Institute/Federal Bureau of Investigation Computer Crime and Security Survey, 46 percent of 
organizations surveyed experienced a financial loss due to a security breach, with a total loss estimate of $67 
million. 
The discipline of information security management is still in its infancy, as evidenced by the lack of empirical 
scholarly work in this area. The little empirical research that has been conducted has shown that poor information 
security management practices exist within many organizations [Baskerville 1993; Kankanhalli et al 2003; Shimeall 
and McDermott 1999]. Most research on information security focuses on specific technologies and algorithms and 
how it impacts the principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. But an important area receiving little 
attention is the antecedents of effective information security management at the organizational level [Stanton et al 
2003]. 
One of the aims of this study is to identify the stages of growth with respect to information security planning. This 
research study will apply King and Teo’s [1997] four-stage evolutionary model of business/information system 
planning integration to information security planning in organizations. The benefits of this are twofold: (1) currently 
there is little understanding of how growth of information security capabilities is taking place, and (2) there is a 
plethora of frameworks for the information security discipline but no obvious ties between them. This stage model 
will provide a new conceptual lens by which information security can be observed, analyzed, and managed. 
Identifying a stage model can assist management with the orderly transition among the stages [Drury 1983], as well 
as identify the current attitudes, management practices, and integration of information security within the 
organization. Another aim of this study is to empirically examine the influence of information security planning 
integration in explaining variation in the effective use of information security strategies. Lastly, the issues of 
centralization versus decentralization of information security planning activities will be evaluated along with its 
impact on the stages of information security planning integration and effective utilization of information security 
strategies. 
This study makes several contributions to the information security discipline. First, this study provides a different 
perspective of evaluating the effectiveness of the organization’s information security function. In addition, the stages 
of information security approach gives analysts and organization executives a means to assess whether conditions 
in place are facilitating or obstructing future growth of the information security function. A final contribution is 
evaluating how organization’s choices in regards to the structure of the information security activities impact 
information security planning integration and the effective utilization of information security strategies. The rest of 
this paper is organized into four sections. The first section describes past research and the development of our 
model along with the related hypotheses. The second section describes the research methodology followed by a 
discussion of the data results. The third section describes the statistical analysis of the proposed model. The last 
section presents the conclusions of our research along with limitations and directions for future research. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rationale behind the use of the literature on information systems planning in this study is twofold. First, Nolan 
[1973], in his original description of the stage hypothesis, states that stages can be identified through measurement 
of the central tendencies that appear in the nature of planning, organizing and controlling tasks associated with the 
computer resource. As the critical nature of systems grow in importance and the complexity of systems increase, 
planning becomes one of the chief mechanisms employed by organizations to reduce uncertainty, ensure the 
availability of staff, hardware, software and financial resources and improve effectiveness [McFarlan et al.,1983]. 
Second, the purpose of information systems planning changes as information systems technology evolves 
[McFarlan et al. 1983; Pyburn 1983]. Therefore, as organizations become more mature in the domain of information 
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Stages of Growth 
Many researchers who examine the corporate lifecycle from birth and ultimately to decline predict that variables 
among environment, strategy, structure, and decision-making methods are significantly different in each stage [Miller 
and Friesen 1984]. Nolan [1973], borrowing from these lifecycle theorists, made the assertion that the computer 
budget is a suitable surrogate by which to measure changes in an organization’s environment, strategy, uses of  
computer technology, and planning and control tasks. As a result, an organization’s computer budget will give some 
indication about the stages-of-growth phenomena within the information systems domain [Benbasat et al. 1984; King 
and Kraemer 1984]. However, several studies failed to empirically validate this assertion [Lucas Jr. and Sutton 1977; 
Drury 1983]. Nolan [1973] would also go on to theorize that with each successive stage the objectives of the 
computer resource, and the organizational responsibility and authority of the computer resource function will shift. 
He would speculate that, as the information system organization matured, the skills of the information system 
managers would shift from a heavy technical focus to a more managerial and administrative focus [Nolan 1973]. 
In 1979, Nolan [1979] proposed a set of benchmarks to measure the stages of growth of the data processing 
function, which included expenditures, technology, applications portfolio, information system organization, 
information systems planning and control, and user awareness. Empirical support for the benchmarks of computer 
budget, the applications portfolio, and data administration have not materialized, while other benchmarks have found 
either strong or partial empirical support [Benbasat et al. 1984]. Since Nolan’s [1973, 1979] work, the stage 
hypothesis approach has been adapted to evaluate end-user computing [Huff et al. 1988], business planning and IS 
planning integration [King and Teo 1997], information centers [Magal et al. 1988], and end-user satisfaction 
[Mahmood and Becker 1985–1986]. 
One of the drawbacks to the stage hypothesis concept is lack of empirical support. Several studies have attempted 
to empirically validate the stages of growth with little success [Drury 1983; Huff et al. 1988]. Two manuscripts 
authored by King and Kraemer [1984] and Benbasat et al. [1984] found a number of problems in Nolan’s method of 
identifying the stages of computing growth. For instance, King and Kraemer [1984] challenged some of Nolan’s 
assumptions like the assertion that the computer budget is a useful surrogate for growth and the contention that 
technological change is the trigger driving change. But despite these limitations, researchers are continuing to refine 
and adapt the stage hypothesis model and analyze it in different contexts within the IS discipline. One explanation 
for the lack of empirical support is the difficulty of accurately measuring the underlying changes in environment, 
structure, strategy, planning and control [Benbasat et al. 1980]. Research in organizational lifecycle and some more 
recent research in information systems addressing the stage hypothesis have found some interesting correlations 
and patterns that suggest the stage-of-growth phenomena is evident with proper measurement and analysis 
techniques [Miller and Friesen 1984; King and Teo 1997; Huff et al. 1988]. 
Information Security Planning Integration Benchmarks 
Role of Information Security Management 
A critical factor impacting the effectiveness of an organizational function is the agreement or lack thereof between 
senior management and the function concerning roles [Lederer and Salmela 1996; Riech and Benbasat 1996; Magal 
et al. 1988]. As such, research examining the role of organizational functions must assess the perspective of both 
the function and senior management [Boynton et al. 1994]. Any inconsistency in understanding of roles can impact 
the effectiveness of the information security function. In addition, through the identification of the role of different 
functions, we can characterize the position of the functional units within an organization [McFarlan et al. 1983]. 
The responsibility of the information security manager has expanded from the protection of information within the 
organization to the need to protect information in an extended enterprise [Fried 1994; Da Veiga and Eloff 2007]. In 
addition, the information security manager must work with service providers and ensure that continuity-of-operation 
plans of critical services are adequate [Dutta and McCrohan 2002]. The decentralization of data and data processing 
and increasing interconnectivity between organizations and customers is, again, promoting a change of the 
information security officer’s role in the organization [Dhillon and Backhouse 2000]. Control becomes increasingly 
difficult in this environment. The role of the information security officer will turn to educating employees so that they 
can make the appropriate decisions in any situation they may encounter [Dhillon and Backhouse 2000]. 
Top Management and User Participation 
Research suggests that user and management expectations influence success [Cheney et al. 1986; Dearden 1972]. 
Two methods useful for managing management and user expectations are training and inviting user and 
management involvement in the development and planning process. The importance of top management support of 
the planning process has been well established in the literature [Lederer and Salmela 1996; Byrd et al. 1995; Earl 
1993; Hartono et al. 2003]. In addition, many studies have found that top management involvement is crucial to the 
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beyond support in that it includes top management’s time and knowledge inputs, not just monetary support and a 
slap on the back. The involvement of top management is necessary for the information security planning process to 
promote an organization planning approach. Planning with a top-down focus, broad participation, and preset 
planning cycles increases the ability of planning teams to align strategies and plans within the organization [Brown 
2004]. A high degree of alignment between information system plans and business plans has been shown to lead to 
a high level of management commitment to the information system plans [Lederer and Salmela 1996], more of the 
plan being implemented [Gottschalk 1999], and increase visibility of the information security function [Lederer and 
Sethi 1996]. 
One of the first critical steps in the information security planning process is acquiring top management support. It is 
through top management support that recognition of the importance of information security planning is 
communicated throughout the organization. The information security planning process will be ineffective in an 
environment where top management has a low level of ownership of the information security philosophy [Atkinson 
2005; Earl 1993]. A low level of attention from management will result in a low level of concern among employees 
[Thong et al. 1996]. Byrd et al. [1995] find a significant positive relationship between top management support and 
the resultant quality of the plans. They also find that the larger the firm the more significant the relationship between 
top management support and plan quality. 
Going beyond top management support, many researchers recognize that top management involvement of high 
quality is critical to the success of information system planning projects [Lederer and Sethi 1991; Premkumar and 
King 1994]. The inputs of top management will influence the alternative futures identified and evaluated during the 
planning process [Lederer and Mendelow 1987]. In addition, top management support and active involvement will 
facilitate management buy-in which will be necessary for plan implementation to happen. In fact, Teo and Ang [2001] 
find ―difficulty to secure top management commitment to implement the IS plan‖ and ―ignoring the IS plan once it has 
been developed‖ to be two of the top problems facing information system planners. This difficulty with getting 
management to support implementation may be due, in large part, to the actual plan being inconsistent with top 
management’s expectations [Lederer and Sethi 1991]. Through active management involvement, information 
security planners can develop plans more in line with managements’ expectations, which will reduce wasted effort, 
time, and expense. 
Numerous studies promote the importance of getting users involved in the planning and implementation process 
[Lederer and Sethi 1991; Segars and Grover 1998; Peffers et al. 2003]. The benefits, touted in the literature, of 
active user involvement, include higher user acceptance, awareness, and ownership [James 1996], greater extent of 
plan implementation [Gottschalk 1999], and higher quality input for the planning process [Lederer and Mendelow 
1987]. Ultimately it is the users who must abide by and use the prescriptions that make up the finalized information 
security plan. The users have been consistently viewed as the weak link in the information security literature [Schultz 
et al. 2001; Wade 2004; Von Solms 2000]. Leaving them out of the planning process has the potential to alienate the 
information users, which could lead to conflict during plan implementation and lasting discord between the users and 
the information security department. An environment of discord is at odds with the ideals of a collaborative, 
knowledge-sharing organization. 
The notion of user acceptance and its impact on behavior and IT use has spawned several well-studied theories and 
models like the Technology Acceptance Model, the Theory of Reasoned Action, and the Theory of Planned Behavior 
[DeLone and McLean 2003; Venkatesh et al. 2003]. In the information system planning literature, user acceptance 
has been found to be critical to the implementation of final plans [Gottschalk 1999]. Failure to implement final plans 
is one of the top problems facing information system planners [Hartono et al. 2003], and without implementation the 
information security planning process is wasted. One of the most effective ways to get users to accept plans is by 
getting the users involved in the planning process [Peffers et al. 2003]. Users are more accepting of information 
security measures when they are involved in the process and contributed to the solution [James 1996; Pattinson and 
Anderson 2007]. 
The knowledge of the vulnerabilities, threats, and risk that face an organization are not exclusively or conclusively 
known at the executive level or within the information security function [James 1996; Pattinson and Anderson 2007]. 
An effective information security process entails scanning the internal and external environment for threats, 
vulnerabilities, and probabilities of occurrence [Loch et al. 1992]. Through widespread user participation, good 
quality information can be contributed to the planning process leading to better plans [Peffers et al. 2003]. In 
addition, within the information security alternatives, there may be usability issues that will impact user resistance 
and the participation of users can help to identify these issues [Chang and Chin-Shien 2007; Schultz et al. 
2001].Organizations shown to effectively use organizational resources to achieve information security and control 
objectives are characterized as having a strong management support and leadership team that embraces user 
involvement in the planning phase [ISACA 2009; Pattinson and Anderson 2007]. 
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Triggers of Information Security Investment and Performance Structure 
The factors, identified in the literature, that trigger information security investment and evaluation include discovered 
information security abuses [Hoffer and Straub 1989], government legislation, media reports, and pressures from 
clients and business partners [Kwok and Longley 1999]. Cavusoglu et al. [2004] identify four approaches an 
organization may use to make information security investment decisions that utilize fear and uncertainty, budget 
restrictions, proxy variables or risk analysis. Traditional approaches to information security assessment utilize highly 
structured methods to evaluate systems. These methods include audit/checklist methods, risk analysis/risk 
assessment methods, and cost accounting/cost justification methods. For instance, the Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (ISACA) published a detailed audit checklist aimed to assess IT governance issues, which 
includes information security. The Government Accountability Office publishes a risk assessment methodology that 
looks at risk to monetary loss, risk to productivity loss, and risk to loss of customer confidence due to a variety of 
information security violations. And the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
800–30 directs information security managers on how to conduct a risk analysis. The NIST also publishes another 
special publication (SP 800–55) that offers a list of information security metrics that organizations may use. 
There are several major criticisms of these highly structured methods; one is the lack of attention directed to people 
considerations [James 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001]. Another criticism is the narrow focus of information 
security that these methods promote [James 1996] and yet another criticism aimed specifically at risk analysis is that 
the process tends to raise more questions than answers [Kwok and Longley 1999; Parker 2007]. It is very difficult to 
measure information security, and, without convincing information security performance measures, the information 
security officer may find budget justification to be difficult [Bodin et al. 2005; Kwok and Longley 1999]. 
Status of Information Security Function 
McFarlan et al. [1983] finds the role of information systems in the organization’s operations or strategy impacts the 
status level of the information systems manager. Within organizations, the information systems security 
management position has evolved in the form of job responsibility and authority [Wylder 1992]. This evolution is a 
result of the changes that occur in organizations in reaction to a changing environment and increasing importance of 
the information security function [Wylder 1992]. The status and level of authority granted to the information security 
officer has been found to significantly influence the success of the information system planning process [Pyburn 
1983]. The results of the information security function and the information security executive getting closer to top 
management is a more effective information security planning process. In fact, Lederer and Sethi [1988] find that 
when the information system executive reported to an organizational level responsible for operational issues (such 
as a controller), they experienced more critical problems in comparison to organizations where the information 
system executive reported to a higher level. Kwok and Longley [1999] list five common problems faced by 
information security officers with inadequate status with the organization which includes lack of full commitment from 
senior management, difficulty in deciding how much security is required and difficulty convincing current levels of 
security to auditors. 
Information Security Manager Involvement in Business Planning 
Top management involvement in the information security planning process has been found to increase information 
system planning success [Lederer and Sethi 1988; Premkumar and King 1994]. The participation of information 
system executives in the business planning process has also been shown to lead to increased information system 
planning success [Lederer and Sethi 1992]. In order to produce useful, relevant information security plans, the 
information security officer must understand the objectives and strategies of the firm in order to produce information 
security plans that fit the organization. Pyburn [1983] suggests that many organizations fail to communicate and 
document completely the strategies and plans of the organization. When strategy decisions and plans are 
documented, it is common to find that the documents are severely lacking in details and subsequently fail to 
adequately guide the information system planners [Henderson and Sifonis 1988]. When information security is 
viewed as having a strategic impact on the organization, the information security executives being left out of the 
communication loop likely renders the information security function ineffective. Some of the benefits that arise from 
the information system executive’s participation in the business planning process include better information systems 
planning and better utilization of resources [Sabherwal 1999]. 
Participation in the organizational planning process also gives the information security executive the occasion to 
educate top management about potential information security issues [Premkumar and King 1994]. In addition, the 
participation of top information system executives in the business planning process has also been shown to lead to 
increased support of information system plan implementation [Lederer and Sethi 1992]. If the information security 
plans do not address the organizational goals and strategies, top management will view the plan as lacking in 
relevance and view the information security executive as unknowledgeable about the business issues facing the 
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Ha1a: More advanced stages of information security planning integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security recovery measures. 
Ha1b: More advanced stages of information security planning integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security deterrence measures. 
Ha1c: More advanced stages of information security planning integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security detection measures. 
IT Organizational Structure 
The belief that organization and IT structure are factors impacting the success, or lack thereof, of the information 
systems function is driving past and current research [Adrai and Chowdhury 2004]. Success has been shown to be 
partially impacted by the management level that is responsible for the MIS function [Alloway and Quillard 1983; Ein-
Dor and Segev 1982]. For this study, the focus will be exclusively on the centralization/decentralization of 
information security management activities. The range of prior academic research within the information systems 
domain that has focused on structure from a centralization/decentralization perspective include examining the 
impact of structure on innovation [Moch and Morse 1977; Zmud 1982], information services [Olson and Chervany 
1980, MIS structure [Ein-Dor and Segev 1982], management of call centers [Adria and Chowdhury 2004], quality of 
computing service [Danziger et al. 1993], and organizational competitive strategy [Tavakolian 1989]. 
The centralization/decentralization decision is a difficult one for management, as evident by the constant tinkering 
and movement between the two extremes [Ein-Dor and Segev 1978; King and Kraemer 1984]. The decision to 
centralize or decentralize information system resources presents unique technical and organizational challenges that 
impact the effectiveness of providing information services [Adria and Chowdhury 2004]. Despite these technical and 
organizational concerns, political and bureaucratic influences are major factors impacting the centralization/ 
decentralization decisions [George and King 1991; King 1983]. 
The information security resources can be centralized, shared between central authority and user groups, or 
decentralized [Kotulic and Clark 2004]. It has been suggested that centralization is more effective preventing 
information security violations through organization-wide establishment of policies and better monitoring [Kotulic and 
Clark 2004]. However, it has also been suggested that, as organizations become more sophisticated and the 
environment becomes more uncertain, the ability to manage in a centralized manner becomes more difficult 
[Benjamin et al. 1985; Govindarajan 1986]. So, in response to greater sophistication and uncertainty, some of the 
decision-making authority must be reassigned to divisions and departments. However, when lower-level employees 
are incompetent to handle certain decisions, the decentralization choice is perilous at best [Nault 1998]. An 
important caveat in the design of the structure of the information security function is specific recognition of decision 
authority and no sharing of decision rights. This leads us to our next hypothesis: 
H2: More advanced stages of information security planning integration are positively associated with more 
centralized information security management activities. 
Prior research attempting to link organizational structure and outcome measures have resulted in conflicting findings 
due to environment, strategy, and technology factors [Fry 1982]. As a result, the information security planning 
integration is believed to account for a significant amount of the variance in the dependent variable. With the addition 
of the mediator variable, the independent variable (information security management structure) is assumed to have 
a small or non-significant effect on the dependent variable. However, it is believed that conditions in the information 
security management structure may enable or obstruct the organization’s ability to effectively reach certain stages of 
advanced information security planning integration and, therefore, is an important construct in the model. This leads 
to the final hypotheses of interest below: 
Ha3a: Information security planning integration will mediate the impact of information security management 
activities on the effectiveness variables of information security recovery measures. 
Ha3b: Information security planning integration will mediate the impact of information security management 
activities on the effectiveness variables of information security deterrence measures. 
Ha3c: Information security planning integration will mediate the impact of information security management 
activities on the effectiveness variables of information security detection measures. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This research model, as seen in Figure 1, encompasses five constructs: the information security structure, 
information security planning integration, information security recovery strategies, information security deterrence 
strategies and information security detection strategies. 
Research Instrument 
Following the template used by Zmud [1982], the survey items request the location of responsibility for each major 
organization-wide information-security decision task. The location of responsibility includes board of directors or 
steering committees, chief executive officer (CEO), chief information security officer (CISO), information security 
officer (ISO) or chief information officer (CIO), divisional or functional manager, sub-department managers, and 
lower-level information security personnel/analyst. The location of responsibility for each activity will be coded as 1 
being the highly centralized position (owners/board of directors) through 6 which represents the most decentralized 
position (lower-level information security personnel/analyst). 
 
Figure 1: Research Model. 
 
The survey items to operationalize this information security planning integration construct are pulled from King and 
Teo’s [1997] manuscript on IT-business planning integration and an analysis of the literature in the information 
security domain. The measurement instrument for the organization’s information security planning integration 
encompasses eight benchmarks that assess alignment of information security with business objectives and 
interaction among stakeholders within the organization. The measurement instrument will ask the respondents to 
choose one of four descriptions within each benchmark that most represents their organization. 
Premkumar and King [1994] suggests that researchers have more success measuring outcome variables of 
planning, strategy, and structure decisions through the use of perceptual measures (i.e., improved communication 
between managers and users) in comparison to more objective measures (i.e., number of security incidents, 
financial costs of security incidents, etc.). Due to the well-documented problems with measuring cost and benefits of 
information systems [Brynjolfsson 1993], perceptual measures are prominent in effectiveness, success, and 
performance research [Galletta and Lederer 1989]. In addition, the use of perceptual measures is encouraged by 
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survey questions that ask respondents to answer sensitive questions (i.e., dollar losses due to security violations or 
number of security violations) or questions that require the respondent to look up information. 
For this study, three information security strategies at the organization are examined. The perceived effective use of 
these three information security strategies will be measured through a 5-point likert scale with 1 representing 
strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly agree. The recovery measures are designed to assess the response 
capabilities of the information security function and the overall organization to information security incidents. The 
deterrence measures are designed to assess the organization’s ability to motivate employees to follow information 
security policies [Straub and Welke 1998]. Detection measures are designed to identify potential information security 
violations and the perpetrators of such violations. 
Baron and Kenny [1986] propose two methods of evaluating a model that includes a mediating variable: three-step 
regression and structural equation modeling. However, some researchers question the use of SEM in an exploratory 
mode [Chin 1998; Lee et al. 1997]. Chin [1998] suggest use of the Partial Least Squares (PLS) statistical approach 
for research studies where the underlying models are still in the early stages of development. As the research model 
of interest in this study is a new and untested model, the PLS technique will be used to explore the relationships 
between the measurement model and the structural model. 
PLS is a components-based structural equation modeling technique used to analyze research models that contain 
unobservable latent variables [Gopal et al. 1992–1993]. A strength of the PLS statistical technique lies in its ability to 
simultaneously model the structural paths and the measurement path with small to medium sample sizes [Chin et al. 
2003]. The measurement model encompasses the relationship between the directly observable survey items and the 
unobservable constructs (latent variables). The structural model represents the proposed relationship between the 
latent variables. One alternative method of assessing the structural model is through regression analysis. While this 
and other multivariate techniques break up the assessment of the measurement and structural model, PLS 
evaluates both concurrently. 
IV. RESULTS 
The data was collected by means of a mail survey sent to information security managers, IT managers, and high-
level executives within an organization. See Table 1 for a profile of respondents. Because the unit of analysis for this 
study is at the organizational level, a good overall understanding of the information security function within the 
organization is necessary. In order to measure effectiveness at the organizational level, Seddon et al. [1999] state 
that top-level management and owners are acceptable query respondents. As a result, the ideal survey respondent 
is the top-level manager responsible for information security and information systems within an organization. Of the 
1500 surveys mailed out, a total of 180 were returned. Of the 180 surveys returned, 61 were discarded because the 
contact person was no longer employed by the organization. Extrapolating the 61 unusable responses out of the 180 
total surveys to the population suggests that 508 out of the 1500 contacts surveyed may be incorrect contact 
addresses. A total of 116 responses was received from the initial mail out. A follow-up mailing, to improve the 
response rate, was sent after three months and requested their participation by directing the respondent to an on-
line version of the survey instrument. The second mailing resulted in an additional 64 responses. Using the 
remaining 992 as the total population, the 119 useable responses results in a response rate of 12 percent. Non-
response bias attempts to identify characteristics that may differ between respondents and non-respondents. To 
assess the differences between late and early respondents, a t-test of independent samples was conducted on three 
separate demographic responses. All p-values are greater than .10, showing no significant differences between 
early and late respondents. 
A varied cross-section of organizations and industries are represented in the data set. For profit companies 
represent the bulk of the respondents (58.83 percent). Government organizations represent 21.84 percent, and not-
for-profit organizations represent 19.32 percent of the data set. While there are a variety of industries represented in 
the data set, more than half of the respondents classify themselves as financial, healthcare, education or 
government, as seen in Table 2. The majority of the organizations participating in the survey employ less than 5,000 
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Table 1: Profile of Respondents 
  Number of responses % Cumulative % 
CIO 42 35.29 35.29 
CISO 8 6.72 42.01 
ISO 6 5.04 47.05 
CTO 3 2.52 49.57 
Director of IT 23 19.33 68.9 
Director of IT Security 2 1.68 70.58 
VP of IT/Information Services 11 9.24 79.82 
Manager of IT 5 4.2 84.02 
Manager of Information Security 9 7.56 91.58 
Security Analyst 4 3.36 94.94 
Asst Comptroller 1 0.84 95.78 
Info Security & Network Administrator 3 2.52 98.3 
Software Engineer 1 0.84 99.14 
Missing value 1 0.84 99.98 
Total 119     
 
Table 2: Industry of Respondent's Organization 
  Number of responses % Cumulative % 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Mining 0 0 0 
Construction 2 1.68 1.68 
Printing, Publishing 2 1.68 3.36 
Transportation 2 1.68 5.04 
Consumer Goods Manufacturing 3 2.52 7.56 
Capital Goods Manufacturing 2 1.68 9.24 
Utilities 1 0.84 10.08 
Retail 6 5.04 15.12 
Food Service 1 0.84 15.96 
Banking, Sec, Invest 12 10.08 26.04 
Insurance 4 3.36 29.4 
Real Estate 0 0 29.4 
Hotels 0 0 29.4 
Business Services 7 5.88 35.28 
Entertainment 1 0.84 36.12 
Health 20 16.81 52.93 
Legal 1 0.84 53.77 
Education 14 11.76 65.53 
Government 20 16.81 82.34 
Military 2 1.68 84.02 
Telecommunications 0 0 84.02 
Other 19 15.97 99.99 
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Table 3: Size of Respondent's Organizations 
  Number of responses % Cumulative % 
Less than 500 34 28.6 28.6 
500 to less than 1,500 29 24.4 52.9 
1,500 to less than 5,000 31 26.1 79.1 
5,000 to less than 10,000 9 7.6 86.6 
10,000 to less than 50,000 8 6.7 93.3 
50,000 or more 8 6.7 100 
Total 119     
Most organizations have an idea of how much of their IT budget is spent specifically on security as shown in Table 
4. However, nine respondents answered unknown to the question asking about percentage of IT budget spent on 
security. This does not imply these organizations are failing to implement security in the IT organization. Two 
organizations commented that their security and IT budget was intertwined as security is being designed into all IT 
projects, making it difficult to separate non-security related activities from security related activities. This is not an 
unexpected result, as it is widely accepted that the most effective way to secure systems is by designing security 
into the system during the initial stages of the system development lifecycle. A crosstab and chi-square test of 
independence shows no significant relationship exists between the variables organization size and percentage of IT 
budget spent on IT security (p-value = 0.21). A crosstab and chi-square test of independence also shows 
that no significant relationship exists between the variables organization type (for-profit organizations, government 
organization, or non-profit organizations) and percentage of IT budget spent on IT security (p-value = 
0.26). 
Table 4: Distribution of Respondents by Portion of IT Budget 






Less than 1% 19 16.0 16.0 
1% to 2% 22 18.5 34.5 
3% to 5% 39 32.8 67.3 
6% to 7% 9 7.6 74.9 
8% to 10% 14 11.8 86.7 
More than 10% 3 2.5 89.2 
Unknown 9 7.6 96.8 
Missing values 4 3.4 100.2 
The results from the survey examining the effectiveness of information security practices shows that the average 
response was 3.4584. As the survey instruments utilizes a 5-point likert scale, this average implies a better than 
neutral response to effective information security practices. An interesting result of this instrument is the two 
information security practices with a lower-than-neutral response concerning user training. Despite numerous 
publications highlighting the critical importance of adequate user training, user training is still perceived to be a weak 
area in many organizations, and this may very well explain the next finding discussed. The effectiveness measure 
with the highest response concerns the ability of the information security department to quickly implement corrective 
measures in response to an information security breach. Poor user training may be leading to a large number of 
easily avoidable information security breaches forcing the information security department to come in and save the 
day. Due to plenty of practice, the strength of the information security department may not be in preventing 
information security breaches but helping the organization recover from information security breaches. 
The information security planning integration measurement instrument asks respondents to review four choices for 
each benchmark and choose the response most representative of their organization. Each choice is tied to one of 
four levels of information security planning integration maturity. See Table 5 for descriptive statistics of the eight 
benchmark variables of interest. The majority of the organizations in the data set falls somewhere between a level 2 
and level 3 stage of information security maturity. This shows that the majority of organizations are choosing to view 
information security strictly from a risk-analysis viewpoint with very little management and user understanding of 
information security threats and impacts. This result also shows that organizations are not placing a heavy focus of 
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information security on developing security-conscious information users and views the goal of information security 
as chiefly to demonstrate compliance with laws and regulations. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Information Security Planning Integration 
   N Mean Std. Deviation 
BMK1 RoleInfoSec 119 2.4538 1.26053 
BMK2 RoleInfoSecManager 117 2.2308 1.14006 
BMK3 TopMgmtParticipation 119 2.4286 1.02156 
BMK4 UserParticipation 119 2.2521 0.91335 
BMK5 PerformanceCriteria 119 2.6975 1.04601 
BMK6 InfoSecTriggers 119 2.7731 0.72995 
BMK7 LevelInfoSecManager 118 2.6610 1.03131 
BMK8 InfoSecManagerParticipation 118 2.5000 1.11516 
Average   2.4996   
Principle component factor analysis utilizing Varimax with Kaiser normalization rotation method was conducted on 
the three measurement instruments. Table 3 shows the results of factor analysis of the dependent variable. After 
factor analysis, the Cronbach’s alpha of each factor is calculated in order to assess reliability. Cronbach’s alpha 
measures the internal consistency of the items in the factor. The lower limit for an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.7 [Hair et al. 1998]. The Cronbach’s alpha calculations are also shown in Table 6. While the items measuring 
detection is slightly below the 0.7 threshold, it is deemed close enough for continued use in this study. The total 
variance explained for the three remaining dependent variables is 71.681 percent. In addition to Cronbach’s alpha 
calculations, the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is evaluated. AVE is a more rigorous assessment of reliability 
with values greater the 0.5 shows acceptable levels of reliability. Table 3 shows the AVE values for each construct. 
The first factor, recovery, appears to measure perceptions related to the security function’s ability to help the 
organization respond to any natural or man-made threats against the organization. The deterrence factor appears to 
measure perceptions related specifically to the training and monitoring of the end user and the end users’ 
willingness to follow organization security policies. The detection factor appears to measure the security function’s 
ability to identify security violations along with who committed the violation and how. 
Table 6: Factor Analysis of Dependent Variable 
  Recovery Deterrence Detection 
Corrective Measures 0.863 0.228 0.144 
Understand DRP 0.922 0.235 0.138 
Understand Continuity 
Plans 0.914 0.241 0.098 
User Training 0.193 0.736 0.105 
User Compliance 0.157 0.848 0.064 
Understand 
Consequences 0.184 0.827 0.157 
Users Disciplined 0.274 0.656 0.250 
Discover Attacks 
Quickly 0.027 0.206 0.696 
Identify Perpetrator 0.162 0.209 0.822 
Identify How Breach 
Happened 0.133 0.000 0.765 
Eigenvalue 4.398 1.464 1.307 
Variance explained 26.448 26.270 18.963 
Cronbach's alpha 0.933 0.824 0.695 
AVE 0.882 0.654 0.619 
Examination of Benchmark Variables 
The information security planning integration construct is the central construct of the model under investigation. This 
construct is measured through the use of benchmarks variables and Nolan’s theoretical lens of functions within 
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security function is identifiable by changes in role, planning orientation, user and management awareness, and 
status of information security. Table 7 shows the Pearson correlations between all benchmark variables. The 
correlation matrix shows benchmark variables 6 (triggers of implementation) and 7 are poorly correlation with the 
remaining six benchmark variables so these two variables are deleted from the final model. The Cronbach’s alpha 
and AVE for the information security planning integration construct is 0.763 and 0.511 respectively which shows 
reasonable reliability. 
Table 7: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Benchmark Variables 
  BMK1 BMK2 BMK3 BMK4 BMK5 BMK6 BMK7 BMK8 
BMK1 1.000        
BMK2 0.391** 1.000       
BMK3 0.446** 0.432** 1.000      
BMK4 0.384** 0.221** 0.570** 1.000     
BMK5 0.434** 0.465** 0.480** 0.338** 1.000    
BMK6 0.229*  0.164 0.177 0.251* 0.187 1.000   
BMK7 0.290 0.170 0.185 0.274* 0.265* 0.004 1.000  
BMK8 0.234* 0.103 0.279* 0.434** 0.304** 0.031 0.412** 1.000 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
V. DATA ANALYSIS 
SmartPLS version 2.0 is used to analyze the measurement model and the structural path between the constructs of 
interest. In order to obtain reliable results and t-values, 200 random samples of 100 are generated using a 
bootstrapping procedure. The hypotheses will be evaluated by assessing the sign and significance of the structural 
path coefficient using one-tailed t-test statistics. PLS Graph does not calculate any goodness-of-fit values, so the 
coefficient of determination is evaluated to assess the predictive validity of the relationships between constructs. 
The research model under investigation specifies that information security planning integration mediates the 
relationship between structure variables and the effectiveness variables. To tests for mediating effects, Baron and 
Kenny [1986] suggest a three-step approach. For mediating effects to be evaluated, there first must be a significant 
relationship between the independent variables and the three dependent variables. Then a relationship must be 
established between independent variables and mediating variable. Lastly, a relationship must be established 
between the mediating variable and the three dependent variables. So three PLS models are analyzed to test for 
significant effects. Table 8 shows the path coefficients and t-values for the three PLS models. 
The first model examines the relationship between the structure variable and the effectiveness variables. The 
structure of information security management variable shows reasonable significance with two of the three 
effectiveness variables. The second model examines the relationship between the structure latent variables and the 
mediating variable: information security planning integration. Baron and Kenny’s [1986] second condition for 
mediating effects is satisfied. The third model examines the relationship between the mediator variables and the 
three effectiveness variables. Baron and Kenny’s [1986] third condition is met as the information security planning 
integration variable is significantly related to all three effectiveness variables. 
Table 8: Results of Testing for Conditions of Mediating Effects 
  Relationship Beta t-values 
 Model 1 Management -> Recovery -0.193 1.730 
  Management -> Deterrence -0.322 2.547* 
  Management -> Detection -0.261 2.716** 
Model 2 Management -> Planning Integration -0.227 2.749** 
  Planning Integration -> Recovery 0.359 3.332** 
Model 3 Planning Integration -> Deterrence 0.484 6.447** 
  Planning Integration -> Detection 0.276 3.026** 
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Figure 2 shows the results of testing the model for mediating effects with Tables 9 and 10 showing the path 
coefficients and resulting t-values. As expected, the path coefficients are significant. In order to test for a mediating 
effect between the management activities variable and the effectiveness variables, another PLS model is evaluated 
with the inclusion of the direct effects between the management activities variable and the effectiveness variables. 
Figure 3 shows the results of testing the model for direct effects between the management activities variable and the 
effectiveness variables. Tables 11 and 12 shows the path coefficients and t-values for the PLS model examining the 
direct effects between the management activities variable and the effectiveness variables. With the mediating 
variable in the model, the direct effect between management activities and the three effectiveness variables are all 
insignificant. This provides evidence of a partial mediating effect of information security planning integration on the 
relationship between the structure of information security management activities and the effective utilization of 
deterrence and detection strategies. Table 13 shows the results of hypothesis testing. T-values and levels of 
significance are not reported for the three hypothesis investigating mediation as these three hypotheses are 
assessed by examining the change in significance of the direct effects between the model without the mediating 
variable and the model with the mediating variable. 
 
Table 9: Path Coefficients for Model with Mediating Effects 
  MGMT Planning Integration 
MGMT  0 0 
Planning Integration -0.302 0 
Recovery  0 0.355 
Deterrence  0 0.481 
Detection  0 0.272 
 
Table 10: t-values for Path Coefficients for Model 
with Mediating Effects 
  MGMT Planning Integration 
MGMT 0 0 
Planning Integration 4.805 0 
Recovery 0 3.388 
Deterrence 0 7.061 
Detection 0 2.568 
 
Table 11: Path Coefficients for Model with Direct Effects 
Between Structure and Effectiveness 
  MGMT Planning Integration 
MGMT  0 0 
Planning Integration -0.293 0 
Recovery  0.084 0.383 
Deterrence -0.178 0.428 
Detection -0.187 0.210 
 
Table 12: t-values for Model with Direct Effects 
Between Structure and Effectiveness 
  MGMT Planning Integration 
MGMT 0 0 
Planning Integration 3.612 0 
Recovery 0.671 3.710 
Deterrence 1.728 5.845 
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Table 13: Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis Results t-value p-value  
Ha1a: More advanced stages of information security planning 
integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security recovery measures. 
Supported 3.332 0.0004 
Ha1b: More advanced stages of information security planning 
integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security deterrence 
measures. 
Supported 6.447 0 
Ha1c: More advanced stages of information security planning 
integration are associated with higher levels of 
effectiveness of information security detection measures. 
Supported 3.026 0.0012 
Ha2: More advanced stages of information security planning 
integration are positively associated with more centralized 




Ha3a: Information security planning integration will mediate the 
impact of information security management activities on 







Ha3b: Information security planning integration will mediate the 
impact of information security management activities on 






Ha3c: Information security planning integration will mediate the 
impact of information security management activities on 






Hypothesis 1a-c proposes that organizations with more advances information security planning integration will more 
effectively utilize recovery, deterrence, and detection strategies. The results show that a significant positive 
relationship between maturity of the information security planning integration and effective utilization of three 
information security effectiveness strategies: recovery, deterrence, and detection. Organizations with more mature 
information security and business planning integration exhibit more sophisticated planning processes that include 
other management and user involvement which leads to more effective information security implementations. This 
finding is consistent with previous research that has shown user involvement in planning leads to better alignment 
between organization objectives and plans [Sambamurthy et al. 1994], higher user acceptance and buy-in [Lederer 
and Sethi 1991; Segars and Grover 1998; James 1996], greater extent of plan implementation [Gottschalk 1999] 
and better quality plans [Lederer and Mendelow 1987]. This finding is also consistent with previous research 
showing that a critical factor to success is how the organization views information security [Bjorck 2001]. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes that more centralized information security management activities are positively related to 
more mature information security and business planning integration. However, the results show a significant 
negative relationship between centralization of information security management and information security planning 
integration. This finding suggest that organizations with more sophisticated information security planning processes 
push the responsibilities of many information security activities down the corporate hierarchy. This pushing of 
responsibilities down the corporate ladder may be dependent on the size of the information security departments. 
More mature information security organizations may very well employ more specialized employees to handle 
specific information security activities. This finding suggests that how the organization chooses to structure activities 
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Hypothesis 3a–c proposes that the maturity of the organization’s information security planning integration will 
mediate the relationship between the structure of information security management activities and the effective 
utilization of information security strategies. The results show partial mediation is present in the relationship between 
structure of information security management activities and deterrence and detection strategies. This result support 
previous research that organizational structure does not have a direct relationship with success variables [Fry 1982]. 
However, model testing shows no mediation is present in the relationship between the structure of information 
security management activities and the effective utilization of recovery strategies. This is an interesting result as it 
implies that how the organization chooses to structure the information security management activities does not 
impact the effectiveness of information security recovery strategies. Meanwhile, how the organization chooses to 
structure information security management activities is impacting the effectiveness of detection and deterrence 
strategies. Data analysis shows the information security planning integration construct explains a significant amount 
of the variance in the effective utilization of recovery, deterrence, and detection strategies. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The results shows that the majority of organizations are choosing to view information security strictly from a cost-
benefit or risk analysis viewpoint. Parker [2007], Gordon and Loeb [2006], and Dutta and McCrohan [2002] discuss 
the dangers of using risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis to examine information security investments and 
implementations. While cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis are great tools for regular occurring information 
security problems like virus attacks, these tools are poor for situational analysis that is more sporadic, like natural 
disasters (i.e., Hurricane Katrina, the great Chicago fire, etc.) or targeted attacks [Parker 2007]. It is good news that 
Gordon and Loeb [2006] find that organizations are gradually beginning to use economic analysis when examining 
information security investments. 
The result also shows that organizations are not placing a heavy focus of information security on developing aware, 
responsible information users. Further evidence of the lack of emphasis on developing responsible information users 
within the organization is seen in the effectiveness measures. The only effectiveness measures that show a below 
neutral response dealt with user training providing further evidence that organizations are not placing enough 
emphasis on developing responsible information users. Verton [2002] finds that less than 50 percent of 
organizations have an IT security and training program for employees. 
The findings also suggests that organizations’ view the goal of information security is chiefly to demonstrate 
compliance with laws and regulations. This is not a surprising finding as liability is the number one concern of 
executives [Dutta and McCrohan 2002]. However, this is a very narrow, short-sighted viewpoint of information 
security, as laws and regulations are geared toward protecting external stakeholders of the organization like 
customers and investors. Information security strategies and investment are more effective when they are aligned 
with organizational mission and objectives [Backhouse and Dhillon 1996; James 1996; Parker 2007]. Laws and 
regulations are not focused on assisting management with the alignment of organizational objectives and 
information security strategies. 
The results show that a significant positive relationship between maturity of the information security planning 
integration and effective utilization of three information security effectiveness strategies: recovery, deterrence, and 
detection. Organizations with more mature information security planning integration exhibit more sophisticated 
planning processes that include management and user involvement, which leads to more effective information 
security implementations. This finding is consistent with previous research that has shown user involvement in 
planning leads to better alignment between organization objectives and plans [Sambamurthy et al. 1994], higher 
user acceptance and buy-in [James 1996; Lederer and Sethi 1991; Segars and Grover 1998], greater extent of plan 
implementation [Gottschalk 1999], and better quality plans [Lederer and Mendelow 1987]. The findings suggest the 
best-performing organizations are those with more sophisticated information security planning processes where the 
role of information security is more focused on supporting the organization’s mission and objectives and the 
performance structure encourages aligning information security investment with organizational objectives. This 
provides evidence for interpretive studies [Backhouse and Dhillon 1996; Baskerville 1991; Dhillon and Backhouse 
2001; Parker 2007] that tout the critical nature of aligning information security initiatives with the organizations 
objectives. 
There are several limitations to this paper. One limitation to this study is the broad, high-level view of information 
security is a simple representation of a very complex, deeply intertwined area of organizational behavior. This study 
also avoids examining the technical and functional details of the organization information security strategies, 
focusing instead on management practices. The technical infrastructure and prevention measures are clearly an 
important consideration in any study of information security within organizations and represent two issues ripe for 
future research. Another limitation is the cross-sectional design of the study which does not permit conclusions 
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about causation. Therefore, only claims of correlations among the variables of interest are possible. One final 
limitations is the low response rate may bias the final results. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
This research supports the position of previous literature [Backhouse and Dhillon 1996; Baskerville 1991; Parker 
2007] describing the importance of aligning information security objectives with overall business objectives. By 
integrating the information security and business planning activities, management can more effectively protect the 
organizational data and resources. This research also suggests that organizations with more decentralized 
information security management activities exhibit more mature information security planning integration. While prior 
research suggest that centralizations is the more effective approach to managing an organizations information 
security [Kotulic and Clark 2004], our findings support a vastly different conclusion. The complexity and uncertainty 
inherent within the information security domain is better managed through the decentralization of information 
security management activities. However, decentralizing a critical function can lead to problems when lower-level 
employees are incompetent to deal with the decision or lack guidance. To effectively deal with the potential 
problems in a decentralized environment, organizations must have strong planning integration. This research also 
offers some evidence that organizational functions can exhibit stages of maturity and that measurement is possible, 
giving some credence to often discussed maturity models discussed in the business world and among standards 
governing bodies (COBIT, CMM, and SOA MM). Future research examining the strategic aspiration of the 
information security function along internal environmental factors and organization’s capabilities may help to better 
explain the variance in effectiveness of information security strategies among organizations. 
VIII. SUMMARY 
Our research hints that information security within organizations is improving as information security planning is 
becoming more integrated with overall business planning and the utilization of information security strategies are 
improving. Organizations recognize the value of integrating information security into the overall business planning 
processes to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of protecting the information assets of the organization. 
Organizations employing more integrated planning processes allow the information security function to push more of 
the decision making down the hierarchy where decisions can be made closer to the problem. 
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